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Reformasi, Vulnerable Values
And The Regulation Of
Television In Indonesia
This paper charts the recent history of the media regulation debate in
Indonesia and examines constructive tensions over regulatory values
and policies which reformasi has made possible. A comparative textual
analysis of two draft bills, one proposed by the state bureaucracy, and
the other by parliamentary representatives, throws into relief tensions
which define reformasi: namely, the tension between an authoritarian
state system intent on shaping cultural development, and an invigorated
public intent on asserting its rights of freedom of expression. This paper
will focus on just three sets of values which the present legislative disarray
and commercial pressures have made vulnerable: diversity, cultural
identity, and the role of the public.

Philip Kitley
University of Southern Queensland, Australia
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he regulation of television in Indonesia is in disarray. It has
been since September 1997, and some might argue that it was
in disarray long before that. The unpopular and controversial
Broadcasting Law #24, signed into law on 29 September 1997, set
up site pegs across the field of broadcasting, but little more than
that. A lot of the detail, especially the government regulations
which were to be drafted by the Department of Information, had
to be in place by September 1999 for the Law to be operational.
The regulations have not been drafted. The management of
television broadcasting has been thrown into chaos by former
President Soeharto’s resignation in May 1998, jostling from five
alternative bills designed to replace the humpty dumpty Law #24,
the recent issue of five “in-principle” commercial television
licenses, and the government’s decision in November 1999 to
dismantle the Department of Information and make the state
television service TVRI pay its own way by raising revenue from
advertising and sponsorships.
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 8, Jan-June 2000
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In one way, perhaps, little has changed. The Broadcasting
Law came late to an industry that had been a government
monopoly since television was established in 1962. When
commercial television was introduced in 1990, it was regulated
by a confused and confusing series of ministerial decrees that
tended to favour the interests of the new commercial licensees
(Kitley 1994). Licenses were issued without any public tendering
process, and there was no independent authority that had the
responsibility of monitoring television. As Indonesian broadcaster
Sumita Tobing has said, “wide and untrammelled powers are
conferred on the Minister for Information over broadcasters in
both the public and private sectors. There is little transparency or
public participation in the framing of laws to regulate the media”
(Tobing 1996, 34).
But in a period of reformasi [political reform], when the
post-Soeharto government asserts its legitimacy and right to
govern in terms of values of transparency and the rule of law, it is
unwise to leave influential broadcasters and the market to their
own devices. Significant social and cultural values become
vulnerable and at risk in an unregulated commercial, multichannel environment (Blumler 1992, 23-42). Blumler’s discussion
relates to programming and broadcasting system values that
Western Europeans considered vulnerable under the increasing
commercialisation of national television in Europe.
The seven vulnerable sets of values identified included
values relating to program quality, diversity, cultural identity,
independence of program sources from commercial influences,
welfare of children and juveniles, maintenance of standards and
the integrity of civic communication. These values are not the
exclusive concern of European policy makers and social observers.
A brief survey of the local literature concerning Indonesian
television, and more widely, the press and television in Asia, shows
that these values are of prime interest in the Asian region, just as
much as in Europe (see Deddy Mulyana and Idi Subandy Ibrahim
1997, Sirikit Syah 1999, Ishadi SK 1999, Garin Nugroho 1995, Veven
Sp Wardhana 1997, Seow 1998, Asad Latif 1998, Venkateswaran
1996).
This analysis will extend understanding of processes of civil
society in Indonesia by taking television as an important site of
policy re-regulation. By and large, international interest in
Indonesian affairs in the last years of the New Order government
has focused on power politics. But the media play an increasingly
important role in Indonesia and have been important in
contributing to civil society processes at least since May 1998. This
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 8, Jan-June 2000
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discussion draws attention to a policy struggle going on in
Indonesia as conservative forces vie with others who uphold more
liberal principles summed up by notions such as freedom of the
press and freedom of information. What I show, however, is that
these freedoms are complicated and that their implementation
requires careful management of new technologies and the
television industry.

Historical
Background

134

Since the events of 21 May 1998 and the period of reformasi
following, regulation of the press and broadcasting has been the
focus of a high-profile debate. The chairperson of the Indonesian
Press and Broadcasting Community [Forum] (MPPI) said that he
and his colleagues wanted to seize the moment of reformasi to
put in place freedoms which had been eroded over the period of
the New Order (Leo Batubara, personal interview 10 June, 1999).
The first Indonesian Broadcasting Law was introduced into
parliament in 1996. It became the focus of intense debate, the
resolution of which was highly controversial (Kitley 1999).
President Soeharto’s action in withholding assent to the Law, the
dominating position of the government in controlling and
managing broadcasting, perceived technical inadequacies in the
Law, and the harsh penal sanctions attached to breaches of the
Law left many individuals and groups with a very bitter taste in
their mouths when the revised Broadcasting Law was ratified in
1997.
MPPI’s first campaign after the fall of Soeharto was to get
press freedom recognised in the People’s Consultative Assembly
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) resolution concerning
Human Rights. They did not get all that they wanted, but did
manage to have the right to access and disseminate information
included in the resolution (see Articles 20, 21 and 42 of TAP MPR
RI #17 Concerning Human Rights).
The debate on press and broadcasting regulation was
assisted by the changed media atmosphere which the economic
crisis and reformasi precipitated. Radio stations, which up until
then were not permitted to broadcast their own news bulletins,
began to put together programs which focused on politics and
current affairs. TV stations and the press focused on news and
current affairs and developed talk shows that were much freer
than ever before. This kind of programming was popular with
audiences and assisted interest groups arguing for changes in
media regulation.
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 8, Jan-June 2000
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Surprisingly, in some ways, the voices which were
prominent in the 1996 debate have been absent from the 1998-99
debate. Sex and violence, children’s programming and
globalisation which were the key issues in 1996 are no longer a
concern. We should note, however, that some of the individuals
who were active in arguing these issues in 1996 were in a
completely different position in 1999. The leading activist in the
1996 debate, American educated Dr Marwah Daud Ibrahim, for
example, a representative of the GOLKAR political group, faced
an uncertain future after May 1998, and in the first half of 1999
was involved in campaigning for the national election. Without
her leadership, the coalition of voices active in 1996 has been silent.
This points to the ephemeral character of civil society activism,
and reflects how significant institutional associations may be in
facilitating advocacy.
In looking at the detail of the legislation which has been
proposed, my interest is primarily on the regulation of television.
The following draft bills have been developed:
1. Mass Media Law (omnibus legislation with sections on
the press, broadcasting and film)
2. Press Law
3. Broadcasting Law
4. House of Representatives (DPR) draft Initiative
concerning Press and Broadcasting
Drafts 1, 2 and 3 are government legislation. The Minister
for Information until November 1999, Yunus Yosfiah, favoured
the omnibus bill, but his department preferred separate bills, each
focused on a specific medium. The Director General of Radio,
Television and Film in the now dissolved Department of
Information said that what might seem to be a superfluity of
legislation did not represent any internal conflict. The bills that
the Department had prepared should be understood, he said, as
“backup”, just in case there was any difficulty with the Mass Media
Law (Azis Husain, personal interview 21 June, 1999). In the end,
in a face-saving gesture, a Mass Media Draft, consisting of three
separate bills (press, broadcasting and film), was presented to
parliament for discussion.
The fourth bill is an important legal development. The
House of Representatives [Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR] did not
initiate any legislation during the period of the New Order. Since
May 1998, the DPR has proposed four bills. The DPR Initiative
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 8, Jan-June 2000
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Concerning Press and Broadcasting [Usul Inisiatif Tentang Pers dan
Penyiaran] is the fifth to come before the House (Tim Pengusual
[Proposers], 24 June 1999). The Initiative is based on the MPPI’s
draft Bill. Table 1 summarises the institutional arrangements
established in the government and the alternative parliamentary
draft.

Language Of
Regulation

136

More revealing, perhaps, than the schematic table, is the
language used in both of the draft bills to describe the role and
functions of the regulatory institutions. The active verbs which
describe the respective roles of the government and the proposed
new National Broadcasting Advisory and Development Body
(Badan Pertimbangan dan Pengembangan Penyiaran Nasional, BP3N)
position the government as the decisive agent in broadcasting
regulation and management. The verbs describing the duties and
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 8, Jan-June 2000
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functions of the BP3N show it to be accountable and answerable
to the government. In all cases, the initiative in management and
administration of broadcasting remains with the government
(Article 47, a-f). In Denis McQuail’s words, politics is still very
much in charge here (McQuail 1998: 107).
The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (IBC) provided
for in the parliamentary draft is divided into two councils: the
Executive Council and the Advisory Council. The Advisory
Council has the duty to monitor the operation of the Executive
Council and does so in the name of the public interest and the
aspirations of the public. The Advisory Council is required to take
account of input from the community in making recommendations
to the Executive Council. The Executive Council is independent
of government and has important powers. But although the
Advisory Council is set up to advise and monitor the Executive
Council, there is no mechanism described which would allow this
to happen. There is no mechanism, for example, for the Advisory
Council to hold the Executive accountable to parliament. While
the independence of the Executive Council separates broadcasting
policy from direct state or government control, the lack of
accountability of this Council is a concern, because it opens the
way for an independent, unaccountable fiefdom to emerge.

Historically, the principle of regulating broadcasting has
rested on the understanding that the electromagnetic spectrum,
upon which broadcasting depends, is a limited resource. A license
to broadcast conferred a right to occupy and use a certain limited
electromagnetic space (Sableman 1997: 86). Because the resource
was public, in the sense that it was a natural resource, users were
permitted to use the resource as long as they did so in the public
interest. The DPR draft recognises this principle explicitly and
proposes that control of the spectrum should be under the control
of the state. The representatives proposing the DPR bill argue that
use of the spectrum should be managed by an independent body,
the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, because the free market
cannot be relied upon to protect community interests, nor
guarantee the standards of a free press (MPPI 1999).
The government draft does not link its licensing power to
control of a public resource. Justification of state control of
broadcasting through licensing is linked to the assumption that
broadcasting plays an influential role in society, a role that may
have both negative and positive benefits. Its power becomes a
means of achieving a series of public interest goals that include
national security strategy, nation-building, education, economic
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 8, Jan-June 2000
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development, cultural development and social control. For some
of these goals, the state is positioned as the protector of its citizens
(Article 2 and 3).
This second situation is more instrumentalist. Broadcasting
has a defined function as a medium of government policy. In the
DPR draft, broadcasting is associated much more with principles
of public service and civil society processes. Historically, in
Indonesia and in other mixed systems, the expectation that
commercial channels as well as the national public broadcaster
should perform a dual role has been a site of tension, as commercial
priorities and public service priorities do not always coincide.
It is revealing that the government draft links its control to
specific, instrumentalist objectives and ignores the issue of the
scarce spectrum. I suggest we can understand this difference
between the two bills as revealing two opposed tendencies: a
centralist, centre-out political and cultural project rather blind to
commercial industry priorities, and a principle of sharing public
resources in an equitable way. The value of public participation is
subordinated to the cultural policies of the state, perpetuating the
paternalistic, cultural-nationalist policies of the New Order period.
The DPR draft separates the allocation of licenses and use of the
spectrum from direct state control as a way of empowering the
public and ensuring that the public has access to what it wants
from the broadcasting system (MPPI 1999: 21).
Both bills agree on state control, and both acknowledge
public interest issues are part of broadcasting, though they differ
on what those interests are. Although it might appear that the
vulnerable value of public participation in the management of
broadcasting is better provided for in the DPR draft, neither bill
includes a public-accountability mechanism (such as hearings)
that would permit examination of whether the users of the
spectrum have operated in the public interest.

Role Of Public
Communication

138

Both the government draft and the DPR draft acknowledge
the public’s right to access and disseminate information. In the
government draft, the globalisation of electronic communications
is acknowledged as having created a channel that satisfies the
community’s right to communicate in creating a democratic
nation. That is to say, both bills describe broadcasting as a medium
and a factor in communications policy. What needs to be examined
is how this dual role is operationalised. What role has the public
in shaping the conduct and development of broadcasting? We can
examine this issue by looking at public participation in hearings,
appointments, complaints and censorship.
In the government draft, appointments to the government
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 8, Jan-June 2000
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broadcaster and BP3N will include government representatives.
The public can not play any part, however, in the appointment of
members of the BP3N, a body which is, however, described as
“representative”. The draft does not provide for any hearings
concerned with license renewal. Complaints from the public may
be directed either to the government or to the BP3N, although no
mechanism for doing so is outlined. The inability to direct
complaints to an institution independent of the government is
offensive to the principles of civil liberties At least the complaints
function should have been delegated to the BP3N as a more
independent arbitrator. In practice, there is no guarantee that the
BP3N will necessarily be made aware of complaints about
broadcasting. The government is nominated as the body which
receives complaints. BP3N is directed to give input as required,
but no mechanism is described for ensuring that all complaints
come before the BP3N.
Article 49, on the community’s role in broadcasting, begins
by invoking the individual Indonesian subject (setiap warga
negara Indonesia…), and in so doing creates the impression that
individual subjects have rights and a role to play in shaping
broadcasting practice. But the whole thrust of the discourse in other
sections of the bill concerns the community and cultural subjects,
not individual subjects.
The Article expansively suggests that individuals can
establish an educational and training institution, make suggestions
about improving and developing the quality of broadcasting,
establish an NGO to exercise “social control” over broadcasting,
and do other kinds of things to advance broadcasting. But this
fantasy of individual action and enterprise trivializes the role of
the public in broadcasting. While it is certainly true that individuals
could do all the things described, given time, education,
connections and funds, the bill does not provide for any systematic
process of canvassing public opinion, nor does it offer established
organisations opportunities to contribute to the improvement of
broadcasting.
Given that most other sections of the bill speak in terms of
the community (masyarakat), the nation and the people, and not
in terms of the individual’s right to access information, express
opinions and circulate information, why is it that in this section
on participation, the discourse is expressed in terms of individual
agency or action? I suggest it is simply to scare off participation
from civil society. By tying the process of participation to individual
initiative, organisation and funding as described by the
government, the bill effectively warns off the very kind of
participation it purports to encourage.
In the DPR draft, appointments to the Indonesian
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 8, Jan-June 2000
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Broadcasting Commission are made from nominations derived
from the broadcasting community, ratified by the head of state.
This mechanism, given other principles such as limited terms and
so on, opens the way for at least some members of the public to
play a very influential role in broadcasting policy and
management. That said, no public hearing mechanism is described
for the licensing process, nor for meetings of the IBC Advisory
Council, even though the Council is required to consider input
from the “broadcasting community” (Article 10 (3)). Similarly, no
mechanism for directing public complaints to the Advisory
Council is provided. Thus neither draft provides adequate
protection for the vulnerable value of public participation in the
regulation of broadcasting, though both drafts endorse and
assume some level of participation.

Pluralism
- External
And
Internal

140

In discussion of media regulation, ideas of pluralism have
been historically important as a way of avoiding authoritarianism
and the dominance of a single ideological position. Internal
pluralism refers to the internal organisation of media enterprises,
where legal obligations provide for democratic internal structures
and for “objectivity” or “balance” in broadcast content and
reporting. External pluralism refers to competition between a
variety of media enterprises, which, it is assumed, will generate
ideological pluralism (Hoffmann-Reim 1992).
In considering provisions for external pluralism, the
government draft provides for a single, national system of
broadcasting in Indonesia under the control of government
(Article 4). In a single system, government and commercial
broadcasters are intended to work together to achieve nation
building goals. In the current DPR bill, this principle is not
articulated explicitly. But the principle is familiar to those who
remember the establishment of commercial television in Indonesia
in 1990. When the first commercial television service was
established, the then Minister for Information, Harmoko, made a
point of emphasising that the new commercial station was not a
rival of the government service, but a complement of the
government service (Suara Karya 16 July, 1990). While from one
perspective this principle might be understood as promoting
external pluralism by inhibiting monopolistic practices, it can
equally inhibit external diversity given the potential the
government has in a single system to control editorial policy and
content. It is also possible that the superior infrastructure of the
government broadcaster, TVRI, could deliver better access to
programming of all kinds than the more recently established
commercial stations could, given their far more limited
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 8, Jan-June 2000
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transmission capability.
Consistent with this general approach to competition,
Article 9 in the government draft states that the government does
not support a free market in broadcasting. This provision inhibits
the external pluralism which, according to free market ideology
will develop from competition between broadcasters. Article 9
states that competition is to be modified so that it does not become
“unhealthy” – a phrase which refers to monopolistic market
dominance. This approach reflects an historical dislike of what
are seen as inherent inequities in capitalism, which may be traced
back to sections of the 1945 constitution, and principles of social
equity in Islam (Kitley 1998: 41-47).
Second, cross-ownership is regulated (Article 9.2), further
modifying free market activity in broadcasting, but this time as a
way of increasing broadcasting diversity by vesting ownership
across a larger number of owners than might be the case if free
market practices of vertical and horizontal integration were
permitted.

Table 2: Cross-ownership rules in the
Government draft, Article 9, 2 (a-f)

More positively, external pluralism is provided for in this
way:
· Horizontal competition: there will be a government
broadcaster plus commercial broadcasters.
· Commercial licenses will be issued for national and
regional coverage.
· Commercial operators are permitted to operate only one
channel.
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 8, Jan-June 2000
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No limit is placed on the number of commercial licenses.
The Department of Information has recently given in-principle
agreement to the issue of five new television broadcasting licenses
(Minister of Information Decree #286, 1999). This was probably
done in a spirit of reformasi. Only one of the applications was
accompanied by a fully worked out business and broadcasting
plan (Tobing, personal interview 6 July, 1999). The issue of licenses
failed to take account of the very limited availability of TV
frequencies, and did not pay attention to industry considerations
such as whether or not ten additional operators would be
economically viable. The issue of new licenses can be understood
either as a poorly informed, political response, or as a deliberate
political strategy of being seen to be doing something consistent
with reformasi.
The DPR draft states in the statement of principles that heads
the draft bill, that broadcasting should not be limited by any party.
We might interpret this statement as an indication of external
pluralism, but it is made as part of a more general statement that
broadcasting should be free of influence, threat, and intervention
from any party.
In the DPR draft, there is the same reluctance to let the
market operate freely noted in the government bill. Competition
is to be reined in so that it does not become unhealthy, and the
market must operate in line with freedoms articulated in Articles
2 and 3. The implicit logic is that monopoly or market dominance
is not consistent with the free flow of information. Article 11
provides for a government broadcaster and commercial
broadcasters. Taken together, these Articles envisage a mixed
government and commercial broadcaster system. The number of
broadcasters will be consistent with creating sufficient diversity
to maintain ideals of democratic freedom and a viable industry.
This last idea is based on an interpretation of “healthy
competition”. Taken positively, it can refer to industry management
and not just anti-monopoly provisions.
Article 16 limits ownership. The cross-media ownership
limits defined in Article 16(2) specify that no individual or
organisation which has a commercial television enterprise as its
core business will be permitted to own press, commercial radio or
other broadcasting enterprises. Article 18 states that TV stations
will be established in locations determined by the KPI. Broadcast
reach will reflect availability of frequencies and the goals noted in
Article 3. The issue of licenses will be determined by considerations
set out in Article 3.
If we look at internal pluralism in the government draft,
these points emerge:
· Programming is to be comprised of 70 per cent local
142
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production content, and 30 per cent imported content.
· The language of broadcasting is to be Indonesian, and
there are very complicated rules about dubbing and sub-titling
programs in other languages. Spanish, Hindi or Mandarin
dialogue, for example, have to be dubbed into English, and then
the English dialogue is given Indonesian subtitles!
· Article 26 suggests that programming should be in line
with community standards
· Suggestions about content are expressed negatively –
what should not be screened, rather than what should be (Article
29).
· Diversity is explicitly acknowledged for news
broadcasting. Free press principles are acknowledged.
· State news and state programs must be relayed at
specified times.
· All film and recorded video programs must pass the
government censor before screening.
· In Article 43, an essentialised construct of Indonesian
identity is invoked. This could be relied upon to pressure radical
programming. Administrative sanctions apply to non-compliance.
· In Article 45, freedom of creation and expression is valued
positively.
These various provisions promise more than they deliver
and hardly support vulnerable values of cultural diversity. The
idea of diversity within Indonesia is not positively encouraged.
In fact, the language policy works against addressing minority
audiences. The role that the national broadcaster might play is
not specified. Whether it will function as a government voice,
which has been its traditional role, or whether it will operate more
in the tradition of public broadcasting, and work toward pluralism
in that way, is not addressed. The recent presidential decision to
make TVRI dependent on commercial advertising and sponsorship
suggests that it will not. Commercial television is skewed towards
the production of entertainment genres targeting audience
segments with buying power. Cultural minorities are unlikely to
attract sponsorship and are unlikely to be the focus or the target
of commercial programming. Commercial priorities apart,
filmmaker Dea Sudarman reported that ethnographic programs
celebrating the diversity of Indonesia were rarely part of TVRI
programming during the New Order period (Personal interview
18 Jan. 1992).
Networking is not discussed, but each broadcaster is
required to erect its own infrastructure. In practice this is a
constraint on diversity, as the large investment in terrestrial
infrastructure favours the larger broadcasters and will encourage
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 8, Jan-June 2000
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networking, as smaller, local stations link up with national
broadcasters to boost programming resources. If broadcasters rely
on downlinks from a common domestic satellite, however, then
the dominance of larger broadcasters is likely to be more
pronounced, as in some cases, they may own the satellite. In any
case, the cost of satellite links will probably be beyond smaller
broadcasters except for special events and programs. The
development of separate transmission infrastructures will likely
work against external pluralism, understood as universal access,
as audiences in remote and inaccessible regions are likely to be
bypassed by commercial operators because of expense.
In the DPR draft there are strong assertions of internal
pluralism. In Article 2 and 3, for example, ideals of freedom of
expression and access to information are described and guaranteed.
Broadcasting content must be related to fundamental goals of
broadcasting as set out in Articles 2, 3 and 4. Censorship is not
mentioned, but in the “Considerations” (Menimbang) section which
typically introduces Indonesian bills, it is stated that because
broadcasting has a mass audience, it must operate in a manner
that is consistent with social norms.
The DPR draft does not provide explicitly for diversity,
however, nor require broadcasters to pay attention to and represent
community views. There is no formal complaints process/hearing
provided for at the time of license renewal. There are no public
hearings provided for at all. The KPI Council is required to take
account of input from the broadcasting community (Article 10 (3)),
but no mechanism for doing so is set out. And it is not clear whether
the broadcasting community includes interest groups, such as
advertisers, consumer groups and children’s TV activists.
There is nothing in either of these bills which addresses the
audience’s right to receive information which conflicts with the
commercial objective of maximising profits. The economic crisis
in Indonesia threw this issue into sharp relief. The survival
strategies of the broadcasters put audience interests to one side.
Re-runs and the scheduling of low quality programs did not satisfy
audiences and led to many complaints (Bisnis Indonesia 21 Feb. 1998,
Media Indonesia 25 Feb. 1998, Kompas 12 Apr. 1998). The crisis
revealed a tension which is a daily reality in commercial
broadcasting, but which is usually modified by regulations
concerning quality, favourable earnings, and competition between
providers. Under conditions of hardship, the tension between
balancing commercial priorities with a diversity of content and
standards of programming which audiences had come to expect,
gave way, as broadcasters tried to cope with dramatic losses in
advertising revenue. Under these circumstances, the values of
program quality became even more at risk than they are generally
144
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in commercial broadcasting
To sum up, the government draft provides for external
diversity, but it is likely that market forces will lead to the
dominance of one or two large broadcasters at the expense of the
others. Internal pluralism is not strongly supported, and Articles
on language, essentialised constructs of cultural identity, and
relays of state broadcasts and news work against diversity of
content. The DPR draft, on the other hand, offers greater potential
for the realisation of internal and external pluralism.

Neither bill includes expressions of a perceived threat from
globalised satellite television and the international trade in
television products and services. There is no reference, for example,
to satellite dishes in either bill, and no regulation of their use. This
contrasts with regulation enacted in the 1980s which was explicit
about how dishes were to be used, tuned and so on.
Both bills restrict direct foreign participation in the
television market. This is part of Articles concerning investment
and establishment of broadcasting stations on Indonesian territory.
The government bill also relies on local content rules to limit the
penetration of imported programming. The split is 70 per cent
local, 30 per cent imported. Further restrictions apply concerning
news. News bulletins may not use segments from overseas as a
regular, permanent part of news programming. This is obviously
designed to make news local. Advertising is also required to
prioritise Indonesian locations, talent and productions (Article 35
(3)). Censorship applies to film and video segments,
advertisements (Article 28; 35 (4)) and Pay TV (Article 17).
The language regulations outlined appear as a very specific,
probably unique response to cultural imperialism and
globalisation. The regulations discriminate against all foreign
languages except English and languages that are part of the
Indonesian family. In the function and role section, specific cultural
goals are nominated, and a national “social control” function for
television is described (Article 3). The goals, too numerous to
mention, invoke the rhetoric of the state ideology Pancasila and
“union and unity” that were the leit motif of New Order cultural
policies. Regarding content, the familiar anti-racial, ethnic and
religious vilification SARA convention is part of Article 29 (5).
Programs which include sadism, pornography and gambling are
also forbidden.
The requirement that commercial broadcasters are obliged
to relay the TVRI national news and “state broadcasts” (Article
32) may also be understood as a cultural regulation strategy – a
way of attempting to shape audience’s understanding of particular
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 8, Jan-June 2000
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political and cultural issues or topics. The regulation disempowers
the commercial market, making it very difficult at times to schedule
programming and keep advertisers happy. It also maintains a
relationship of dependency and emphatically asserts the reality of
a single broadcasting system under government control.
“Special” broadcasting services such as cable and other
multimedia services are required to exercise “self-censorship” or
“internal” censorship to counter “negative impacts” of the material
broadcast (Article 17). Further, to discourage a purely commercial
orientation on the part of special broadcasters and to prevent them
from becoming simply a funnel for imported content, overseas
programming must be balanced by broadcast of a fixed proportion
of local programming at a ratio of 1 local to every 10 imports.
Taken together, the 70/30 rule, the language rules, and the
anti-vilification convention provide the state with sufficient means
to limit the circulation of foreign content. The relay requirements
are a more proactive or positive assertion of a particular cultural
policy or project. Taken together with the high level of state control
over the management and development of the broadcast sector,
the government bill seems highly protectionist.
The DPR bill, on the other hand, is not nearly as resistant to
global television. As in the government bill, the DPR bill prevents
foreign broadcasters from establishing permanent stations in
Indonesia. But broadcast content is not divided into local and
imported programming, censorship is not mentioned, and no
restriction is placed on the language of broadcasting.
Comparatively, then, this bill is generally unconcerned with issues
of cultural sovereignty and protection from cultural imperialism.

Conclusion
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I have outlined an important process of re-regulation in
Indonesian broadcasting. The legislative process has been
characterised by greater openness and greater attention to
fundamental issues affecting the broadcasting sector than ever
before. This has been possible because of the leadership given by
a number of highly idealistic and committed individuals who
seized the moment of reformasi to introduce important changes
into the system. That has been their strength and their weakness.
From an outsider’s perspective, the bill proposed by the MPPI and
taken up by the DPR is still very much a single-issue bill. Reading
earlier drafts, it is easy enough to see that what exercised the forum
in the beginning was primarily the vulnerability of the values of
freedom of expression and opinion, summarised by the idea of
freedom of the press. As most of the forum members were closely
associated with the print media, not broadcasting, the bill that was
developed is insufficiently attuned to broadcasting industry issues.
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The forum’s opposition, for example to the omnibus bill, reflected
outdated thinking and a desire to preserve the media system as it
was, rather than consider the cultural, technological and
commercial implications of convergence.
I suspect further, that the forum was not in a good position
to get close to the television industry and its key players. As we
know, the existing commercial television stations in Indonesia were
all granted licenses without formal tender, and stations are owned
either by cronies or family of former president Soeharto. The
experience of 1997, when the owner of TPI, Siti Hardiyanti, lobbied
her father for concessions on behalf of commercial television
stations, perhaps prejudiced the forum against dealing with their
colleagues in commercial television. If this analysis is correct, then
it is easy to understand why a clearer and more specific industry
focus was not developed for the DPR draft. Issues of convergence,
and a closer analysis of the financial viability of an expanding and
diversified television industry should have been part of reregulating television in Indonesia. Close attention to these issues
would help protect values of diversity, cultural identity and
freedom of expression which often become vulnerable in an
environment where highly competitive relations lead to financial
instability and an easy reliance on imported content.
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